Eastern Europe Is Privately Not Quite as Pro-Ukraine as Western Media Claim

By Sundance

If you were a curious and nationalist minded European person who wanted to better understand the dynamic of American politics, such an intentioned person would likely visit Washington DC to meet, understand and absorb the reality of USA politics.  However, that approach, while familiar, would be a mistake.

A visit to the DC beltway would generate opinions and insights from the perspective of the federal government apparatus.  Additionally, the U.S. politicians are going to repeat the policy agenda points that are debated and discussed.  But does that approach really inform the curious visitor about how Americans feel, engage and interact with the government?   The answer is no; the visitor would get the official skewed perspective, but leave without any understanding of how the policies described are actually considered by the American people.

To really understand the nature of how Americans view the political dynamic inside the U.S., as well as discover how the people would be reacting to policy or possible workarounds therein, the curious visitor would need to go to where the boots on the ground are – to the actual people who are engaging in American life.

The reverse of this scenario is also true.  Traveling from the USA to visit Spain, Holland, Hungary or Belarus, and spending time with their political leadership, will only gain you a top-level policy outline of what those officials and politicians are trying to achieve.  If there is a conflict between the official position and the actual reality on the ground, the curious visitor would never see it.

This dichotomy is the fatal flaw within the process of gathering information.  Tucker Carlson or (fill_in_blank) cannot understand how/if the political policy transfers to the citizens by talking to the known leadership.  What is happening on the ground could be entirely different, and that begins the conversation to a larger awakening.

My curiosity revolved around Western global sanctions against Russia.  It has been almost two years since massive sanctions against Russia were implemented.  The goal of the sanctions was to hurt Russia economically, weaken Putin domestically, and ultimately change the outcome in Ukraine.  However, the Russian economy is larger than before the sanctions; the Ruble is stronger against the US Dollar than before; Vladimir Putin is more supported inside Russia than before, and most of the financial and economic systems under sanction have failed to yield a substantive difference on the ground in Russia.

How is this possible, when we are told the sanctions delivered hardship to Russia?  The answer is simple; the sanctions didn’t work.   Why not?  What is happening?  These were the questions I had in mind as I went to where the economic systems are actually being engaged by the people.  I can say with certainty what I found is nowhere in any Western media presentation.

I will describe tomorrow the granular details of why the claims of the west do not match the reality of what is taking place.  On the ground, the sanctions are invisible because ordinary people in Europe, (a) are not in alignment with the expressed government intent, and (b) therefore have no issue constructing ways around them.

The US, UK, France and bureaucrats in Brussels are the tip of the spear against Russia, but behind that face there are EU mechanisms that do not align.   Things are not what they seem.

Before getting to those details, some of which have to be shared carefully due to the sensitivity of the information and process (sand in the machine), let’s start by looking at the subtle indications which will validate what we discuss next.

WASHINGTON DC – Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán regularly pushes the EU to the cliff edge, but diplomats are panicking that his hostility to Ukraine is now about to finally kick the bloc over the precipice.

A brewing political crisis is set to boil over at a summit in mid-December when EU leaders are due to make a historic decision on bringing Ukraine into the 27-nation club and seal a key budget deal to throw a €50 billion lifeline to Kyiv’s flailing war economy. The meeting is supposed to signal to the U.S. that, despite the political distraction over the war in the Middle East, the EU is fully committed to Ukraine.

Those hopes look likely to be knocked off course by Orbán, a strongman who cultivates close ties with Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and who is widely seen as having undermined democracy and rule of law at home. He is demanding the whole political and financial process should be put on ice until leaders agree to a wholesale review of EU support for Kyiv.

[…] Previous peacemakers such as former German Chancellor Angela Merkel or other Orbán-whisperers from the so-called Visegrád Four — Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — are no longer there. The expected comeback of Donald Tusk for Poland, a pro-EU and anti-Russian leader, will only heighten Orbán’s status as the lonely, defiant hold-out.

“There is no one left to talk sense into Orbán,” a third EU official said. “He is now undermining the EU from within.”

[…] In theory, Brussels could come out with the big guns and use the EU’s so-called Article 7 procedure against Hungary, used when a country is considered at risk of breaching the bloc’s core values. The procedure is sometimes called the EU’s “nuclear option” as it provides for the most serious political sanction the bloc can impose on a member country — the suspension of the right to vote on EU decisions.

Because of those far-reaching consequences, there is reticence to roll out this option against Hungary. When EU leaders brought in “diplomatic sanctions” against Austria in 2000, the day after the party of Austrian far-right leader Jörg Haider entered the coalition, it backfired. Many Austrians were angry at EU interference and anti-EU sentiment soared. Sanctions were lifted later that year.

There is now a widespread feeling in Brussels that Article 7 could create a similar backlash in Budapest, fueling populism and in the longer term potentially even trigger a snowball effect leading to an unintended Hungarian exit of the bloc.

Given those fears, diplomats are doubling down on ways to work around a Hungarian veto. (read more)

Now you know why I went to Budapest. What I can tell you is the nationalist outlook, a sentiment against the interests of Brussels, is not only an Orban perspective.  The Hungarian people, and the institutions therein, have no issue with Russia.  This extends to the reality within the Russian consulate in Budapest; you’ll specifically see how this all manifests tomorrow.

(Washington DC) – […] Instead of targeting flagship exports like oil and gas, Ukraine’s European allies will focus on restricting trade in diamonds, iron and copper, which are of relatively little value to the Russian state. When it comes to energy, “we’ve reached the capacity of what we can do without shooting [ourselves] in the foot and harming our competitiveness,” one EU diplomat claimed.

The biggest omission is liquefied natural gas, the all-important fossil fuel that netted President Vladimir Putin’s regime an estimated $6.6 billion in sales in the EU this year alone. Countries like Spain and Belgium have actually even boosted their LNG imports by a massive 50 percent in 2023, compared to 2022.

Meanwhile, hopes that Europe could agree to shut the door on Russia’s atomic energy sector given its dangerous occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant — the continent’s largest — have failed to materialize. Hungary is expanding one of its own atomic power stations with Moscow’s help and populist Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has vowed to veto any sanctions that would hurt the industry, despite criticism from EU and Ukrainian officials alike. Unanimous support from all 27 member states is needed to impose new restrictions, meaning talks on the subject are now deadlocked. (read more)